ON THE COINCIDENCE OF THE FEEDBACK NASH AND STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium independently of the player being the leader of the game. Secondly, sufficient conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the two equilibria are defined. A review of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting in which differential games are defined. In this setting the first movement advantage of the leader may disappears and then both equilibria coincide.Differential Games; Stationary Feedback Nash Equilibrium; Stationary Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium; Coincidence.

TARIFF AGREEMENTS AND NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE INTERNATIONAL MONOPOLIES: PRICES VERSUS QUANTITITES

In this paper we model the case of an international non-renewable resource monopolist as a differential game between the monopolist and the governments of the importing countries, and we investigate whether a tariff on the resource importations can be advantageous for the importing countries. We find that the results depend crucially on the kind of strategies the importing country governments can play and on whether the monopolist chooses the price or the extraction rate. For a price-setting monopolist it is shown that the importing countries cannot use a tariff to capture monopoly rents if they are constrained to use open-loop strategies, even if the governments sign a tariff agreement. This result is drastically modified if the importing countries in the tariff agreement use Markov (feedback) strategies. For a quantity-setting monopolist the nature of the game changes and an open-loop tariff is advantageous for the importing countries. Moreover, in this case the importing countries in a tariff agreement enjoy a strategic advantage which allows them to behave as a leader.tariffs, tariff agreements, non-renewable resources, depletion effects, price-setting monopolist, quantity-setting monopolist, differential games, open-loop strategies, linear strategies, Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium

On the Coincidence of the Feedback Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games

In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria are defined in terms of the instantaneous pay-off function and the state equation of the game. Secondly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence both equilibria are identical independently of the player being the leader of the game. A survey of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting in which differential games are defined. In this setting the first movement advantage of the leader may disappear and the both equilibria coincide.Differential games, stationary feedback Nash equilibrium, stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium.

On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax Revisited

In this paper the scope of Bergstrom’s (1982) results is studied. Moreover, his analysis is extended assuming that extraction cost is directly related to accumulated extractions. For the case of a competitive market it is found that the optimal policy is a constant tariff if extraction is costless. However, with depletion effects, the optimal tariff must ultimately be decreasing. For the case of a monopolistic market the results depend crucially on the kind of strategies the importing country governments can play and on whether the monopolist chooses the price or extraction rate. For a price-setting monopolist it is shown that the importing countries cannot use a tariff to capture monopoly rents if they are constrained to use open-loop strategies, even if the governments sign a tariff agreement. This result is drastically modified if the importing countries in the tariff agreement use Markov (feedback) strategies. For a quantity-setting monopolist the nature of the game changes and the importing country governments find it advantageous to set a tariff on resource importations. Moreover, in this case the importing countries in a tariff agreement enjoy a strategic advantage which allows them to behave as a leader.Tariffs, Tariff agreements, Non renewable resources, Depletion effects, Price-setting monopolist, Quantity-setting monopolist, Differential games, Open-loop strategies, Linear strategies, Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium

On the Independence Jeffreys prior for skew--symmetric models with applications

We study the Jeffreys prior of the skewness parameter of a general class of scalar skew--symmetric models. It is shown that this prior is symmetric about 0, proper, and with tails $O(\lambda^{-3/2})$ under mild regularity conditions. We also calculate the independence Jeffreys prior for the case with unknown location and scale parameters. Sufficient conditions for the existence of the corresponding posterior distribution are investigated for the case when the sampling model belongs to the family of skew--symmetric scale mixtures of normal distributions. The usefulness of these results is illustrated using the skew--logistic model and two applications with real data

Bayesian modelling of skewness and kurtosis with two-piece scale and shape distributions

We formalise and generalise the definition of the family of univariate double two--piece distributions, obtained by using a density--based transformation of unimodal symmetric continuous distributions with a shape parameter. The resulting distributions contain five interpretable parameters that control the mode, as well as the scale and shape in each direction. Four-parameter subfamilies of this class of distributions that capture different types of asymmetry are discussed. We propose interpretable scale and location-invariant benchmark priors and derive conditions for the propriety of the corresponding posterior distribution. The prior structures used allow for meaningful comparisons through Bayes factors within flexible families of distributions. These distributions are applied to data from finance, internet traffic and medicine, comparing them with appropriate competitors